Conference System, VII Research Workshop on Institutions and Organizations

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PLURAL FORMS OF ORGANIZATION: DOES HISTORY MATTER?
Paula Sarita Bigio Schnaider, Maria Sylvia Macchione Saes, Luiz Carlos Demattê Filho

Last modified: 2012-09-13

Abstract


Although various studies have demonstrated the stability of plural forms over time - namely the simultaneous use of two or more organizational forms in the governance of similar transactions (Lafontaine & Shaw, 1999, 2005; Azevedo & Silva, 2001, 2007) – many theoretical advances are still required in this field, especially with respect to understanding its underlying motivations.

 

In this sense, it is worth noting that even though authors like Bradach and Eccles (1989), Bradach (1997), Heide (2003) and Parmigiani (2007) have made significant contributions to the understanding of the reasons driving companies to the use of plural forms, little attention has been devoted to analyzing dynamic aspects within this kind of decision.

 

Therefore, in this paper, it is sought to point out the need for a more dynamic view of plural forms. More specifically, it is intended to demonstrate that these forms may result from some governance decisions being constrained by former governance choices – the so-called governance inseparabilities (Argyres & Liebskind, 1997). In the terms of Argyres and Liebskind (1997, p.2) “[…]over time, the governance of some transactions that a firm seeks to engage in may become inseparably linked with the governance of other transactions […]”. This is why managers might be induced to select governance configurations that differ relative to the efficient choice revealed by Williamson’s (1996) discriminating alignment hypothesis.

 

To this end, an embedded case study (Yin, 2003) is conducted in order to analyze the organic production and distribution of tomatoes and eggs in the Brazilian “Korin” company, which produces and commercializes various natural products, namely vegetables, fruit, poultry and eggs; in accordance with the guidelines laid down by Mokiti Okada. In practical terms, these agricultural techniques are fully compliant with the legal requirements in order for the food to be provided to consumers as organic.

 

There are two peculiarities making this case study particularly interesting. To begin with, plural forms have been selected to govern both the production and the distribution of tomatoes and eggs within the company. In other words, not only do those production chains present plural forms once, but twice. In addition to that, the production of each product requires specific and differentiated techniques relative to the other and to the conventional production process, justifying the various rates of plural forms that could be observed.

 

With reference to the empirical results, it is worth noting that the findings relative both to the production and to the distribution of those organic products favorably support the hypothesis that history matters in the choice of a plural form. Furthermore, there is evidence that there could be governance inseparabilities within Korin’s decision to supply and distribute tomatoes and eggs through plural forms.

 

References

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AZEVEDO, P.F..; SILVA, V.L.S.  Contractual Mix Analysis In The Brazilian Franchising. Working paper, ISNIE, 2001.

 

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BRADACH, J. L. Using the plural form in the management of restaurant chains. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 42, No.2, 1997.

 

BRADACH, J.L.; ECCLES, R. Price, Authority and Trust: from Ideal Types to Plural Forms. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 15, 1989.

 

HEIDE, J.B. Plural Governance in Industrial Purchasing. Journal of Marketing, Vol. 67, 2003.

 

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PARMIGIANI, A. Why do firms both make and buy? An investigation of concurrent sourcing. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 28, 2007.

 

WILLIAMSON, O. E. The mechanisms of governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

 

YIN, R.K. Case study research and methods. 3. ed. California: Sage Publications, 2003.

 

 


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