TOLERANCE AND VOTERS' BEHAVIOR: DO CORRUPTION AND IDEOLOGY MATTER?

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Abstract

Motivation: It is quite puzzling that corruption persists in democratic countries given that voters have the electoral chance to choose honest politicians for political positions and punish those ones that misbehave.

Myerson (1993) explained that parties or candidates are different in honesty and ideology. When there are candidates available for all ideological positions, there is less room for dishonest candidates, since voters have more options. Otherwise, voters may tolerate a dishonest candidate if he or she is ideologically preferred. Even though literature suggests that ideology may predict voting for a corrupt candidate, it is not clear what underlying mechanisms are behind this choice.

Research Problem: The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to investigate the impact of type of misconduct and ideological matching on voters' perception of corruption; and (2) whether the perception of corruption influences voters' choice.
For these purposes, we investigated the following hypothesis:

H1: The type of corruption (money or patronage) affects how corruption is perceived in a way that a behavior is less likely to be considered corruption when it does not involve money.

H2: Ideology will interact with the relation between type of corruption and its perception in a way that:

H2a: when voters and the candidate share the same ideology, voters will consider that patronage is not corruption;

H2b: when voters and the candidate have different ideology, voters will perceive that patronage is corruption.

H3: The presence of a political party strengthens the interaction between ideology and type of corruption in a way that:

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H3a: when voters and the candidate share the same ideology, the presence of a political party will increase voters' perception that patronage is not corruption;
H3b: when voters and the candidate have different ideology, the presence of a political party will increase voters' perception that patronage is corruption.

H4: The way corruption is perceived (how wrong it is) affects choice.

Method: After reviewing the relevant literature, our investigation is carried out through an experimental approach. We simulated a second term presidential election in which respondents would have to choose between two candidates to vote. We manipulated one of the candidate's characteristics, varying type of corruption and ideology.

The procedure was the following: when people agreed to participate, they received an instruction asking them to: (1) read the profile of both candidates; (2) made the decision in whom to vote for; (3) answered a questionnaire measuring the type of processing (whether the corrupt candidate was seen as a cost-benefit choice – he steals, but he gets things done – or if he was seen as not corrupt); (4) answered a questionnaire measuring ideology; and (5) answered some socio-economic questions.

Preliminary results: Preliminary results indicate that a candidate who practiced patronage is viewed as 'less wrong' than someone in which the gains-from-trade involved money. In addition, when voters and the candidate share ideological preferences, voters are less likely to consider the candidate's behavior as corrupt than when they have different ideology. Finally, it also indicates that ideology not only affects voters' perception but it also affects voters' choice.

Key words: corruption, ideology, elections

Introduction

Corruption is a recurrent topic in the literature (Ewoh, Matei, & Matei, 2013), as it is a pervasive phenomenon, costing to our society about $2.6 trillion dollars, what represents 5 per cent of global GDP (Graycar, & Sidebottom, 2012). Even though democracy is sometimes negatively related to corruption (Tiwari, 2012), this relation is not clear, with findings pointing that corruption and democracy are not related (Lambsdorff, 2006, Treisman, 2007) or even positively correlated (Keefer, & Vlaicu, 2008).

It should be surprising; nevertheless, that corruption persists in democratic countries, where voters have the chance to choose honest people for political positions (Melo, Pereira, & Figueiredo, 2009, Pereira, Melo, & Figueiredo, 2009). Even though voters hold politicians accountable for corruption, they do not do so to the point of preventing misbehavior (Pereira *et al.*, 2009).

Literature has suggested some reasons why people would choose to vote for a dishonest person. The information hypothesis, for instance, suggests that voters' support to corrupt politicians takes place when they lack information about candidates' involvement in corruption upon which they then could act in the voting booth (Winters, & Shapiro, 2010).

The authors found that it happened in Brazil, where people voted for corrupt politicians, even expressing a strong preference for punishing them.

There are other explanations for the phenomenon of corrupt behavior being tolerated by the civil society. Myerson (1993), for instance, explained that parties or candidates are different in honesty and ideology. When there are candidates available for all ideological positions - what happens for proportional representation and multimember districts – there is less room for dishonest candidates, since voters have more options. However, in single-member districts, where only one candidate can win the election, voters may tolerate a dishonest candidate if he or she is ideologically preferred.

This sounds as a possible explanation for the cases in which candidates are known to have corrupt behavior and still win the elections. For instance, Pereira (in press) found that even though corruption decreases the probability of a candidate's reelection; the negative marginal effect of corruption on reelection disappears when there is an increase in public expenditure.

Even though literature suggests that ideology may predict voting for a corrupt candidate, it is not clear what psychological processes are behind this choice. On one hand, standard economic model of rational behavior explains that a person consciously acts in a dishonest manner when the benefits are higher than its costs (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). If the voting behavior follows the same pattern, one should choose a corrupt candidate when the benefits of electing him or her are higher than the costs of his or her corruption.

On the other hand, a psychological perspective introduces the idea that cheating may hurt one's self-concept of being honest (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Thus, even though there are situations in which the benefits of cheating may compensate its costs, one may decide not to cheat to avoid the guilt of being dishonest. According to the authors, an alternative is to behave dishonestly enough to profit but honestly enough to delude themselves of their own integrity.

Considering this perspective, it is possible that some kinds of corruption may be seen as 'not that serious', which allows voters to see corrupt candidates as honest. Mazar, & Ariely (2006) supports this view, introducing the idea of self-deception, whereby individuals reframe an act to themselves in a way that makes the act not be perceived as dishonest. Two variables are particularly sensitive to reframing: (a) the type of misconduct, which can be easier or harder to interpret in a more positive light and (a) the individual's motivation to appraise the context, which may be higher or lower depending on the extent to which the misconduct threatens the self.

With respect to type of misconduct, Mazar *et al.* (2008) provide a nice illustration. These authors show that people cheated more when the reward for cheating was tokens instead of coins, even though they had the same value. The explanation behind it is that people understand media differently (Hsee, Zang, & Zhang, 2003), so that tokens were not processed the same way as the coins, even though they had the same value. It being true, it is possible that corruption involving money is perceived as more serious than gains from trade mechanisms involving other assets, such as patronage.

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With respect to ideology, there may be a difference in perception considering who has practiced the misconduct. For example, physicians reported that receiving gifts from the pharmaceutical industry is generally wrong, but when they faced this situation themselves, their evaluation changed, especially when they remembered how much sacrifice they made during medical training (Sah & Loewenstein, 2010).

So, the purpose of this paper is: (1) to investigate the impact of type of misconduct and ideological matching on voters' perception of corruption; and (2) whether the perception of corruption influences choice. After reviewing relevant literature about these topics, this investigation is made through an experimental approach. After that, we present the results, discussion, limitations and suggestions for future investigations.

Theoretical Background

Dishonesty

According to the standard economic model of rational behavior, one would act in a dishonest manner when the benefits are higher than its costs, which is a cognitive process (Allingham, & Sandmo, 1972; Becker and Stigler, 1974). Considering this trade-off, in an election context, it is possible that corrupt candidates are preferred when their benefits are believed to compensate their costs.

This cognitive trade-off has been found in studies in which a not "totally honest", but efficient person is preferred if compared to an honest, but "not that efficient" person (Figueiredo, 2004, Almeida, 2006, 2007). There is even some literature suggesting that there are circumstances in which corruption is not that harmful, but instead, it has some social, economic and institutional roles in transition societies (Sousa, 2008).

However, there are other approaches that explain that the cost-benefit trade-off is far from being sufficient to explain dishonest behavior. Evidence from psychology, sociology, anthropology, behavioral and experimental economics, neuroeconomics and neuroscience explain that people have internal reward mechanisms that exert influence on individuals' decisions (Mazar & Ariely, 2006).

The psychological approach explains that when the temptation for dishonesty arises, people's moral standards are also taken into account (Mazar *et al.*, 2008). The authors explain that, in this sense, even if misbehaving seems to be worthwhile, the fact that this behavior is perceived as being wrong seems to be sufficient to prevent one from doing so.

Taking this fact into account, when developing a general model of dishonest behavior, Mazar and Ariely (2006) proposed that the decision for dishonesty includes both internal psychological reward mechanisms for honesty and dishonesty. Mazar *et al.* (2008) explained that people often feel the conflict between benefiting from doing something wrong and acting according to their belief of being honest. As a result, they tend to cheat, but 'just a little'.

In other words, the authors explain that people tend to commit small dishonest acts, which allow them to have some benefit, but do not affect an honest self-image. The fact that, under

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some circumstances, the perceived "wrongness" of a dishonest behavior influences one's decision to commit it has already been found in the literature (Newman, 1979, Erffmeyer, 1984, Goldstone & Chin, 1993).

For example, Farrignton and Kidd (1977) found that more people claimed to own a coin, which did not belong to them, when its value was low compared to high, Gino and Pierce (2010) found that people tend to discount the wrongness of crossing ethical boundaries to hurt or help others when the action restores equity, and Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2005) found that students cheated only 20 percent of the possible average magnitude, even when they had no chance to be caught.

Considering these ideas, it is possible that our evaluation of other people's acts, such as politicians', follows the same pattern. Even though it has not been explained by literature yet, it seems reasonable that if a politician does something 'just a little' wrong, voting for him or her may sound acceptable because it would not hurt voters' honesty. However, if wrongness becomes larger than this 'little', it may be perceived as too much and the politician would turn to be considered corrupt.

One aspect that changes perception about the seriousness of a dishonest behavior is medium. Mazar *et al.* (2008) found that people cheated more when the reward for cheating was tokens instead of coins, even though they had the same value. The explanation behind it is that people understand media differently (Hsee *et al.*, 2003), so that tokens were not processed the same way as the coins, even though they had the same value.

In the political context, literature provides evidence of the relativism of what is considered corruption and what is not (Schwenke, 2000, Le Billon, 2003), as ethical norms are ubiquitous (Resnik, 2011). Corruption is commonly defined as the misuse of public office for private gain (Le Billon, 2003) and it is not clear what actions are considered a 'misuse'. This idea suggests that there are modes of corruption which are considered 'more wrong' than others.

Johnston (1986) explains that the kinds of behaviors that will be socially defined as corrupt may vary as a function of social attachments and customs, such as kinship, political culture and popular attachment to government (or lack of it); attributes of the political process, such as its speed, patterns of access and exclusion, and economic characteristics, such as relative size of the public sector.

Therefore, it is possible that the same behavior is considered corruption for a group of people and not for others. For example, Filgueiras (2009) found that people who understand public interest as everybody's responsibility perceive that an act committed by anyone which affects the government is corruption. On the contrary, people who understand public interest as a government's responsibility perceive that an act is corruption only when it is committed by a politician or a public bureaucrat.

Patronage is a clear example of a doubtful practice. It can be conceptualized as the allocation of material benefits for political support or other personal benefits (Green, 2010) and it happens when the choice for a political position is based on social, affective and ethnic

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relations instead of competency, policy platforms or ideological positions (Chandra, 2003, Borges, 2010).

While it is often considered a mode of corruption (Filgueiras, 2009), it can also be viewed as legitimate (Chabal & Daloz, 1999), as a culturally accepted selection criteria of who should receive private goods, such as political positions (Filgueiras, 2009) or as being part of moral obligation and emotional attachment (Fjeldstad, Kolstad, & Lange, 2003). Le Billon (2003) explains that patronage is considered legitimate when it can ensure some degree of political stability because it warranties the prevalence of reciprocity among political actors.

If these ideas are true, it is possible that corruption involving money may be perceived by voters as more serious than corruption involving patronage. Thus, it is possible to hypothesize that when corruption does not involve money (e.g. involves patronage), fewer people will perceive the candidate as being a corrupt person. Thus, in other words, we propose that:

H1: The type of corruption (money or patronage) affects how corruption is perceived in a way that a behavior is less likely to be considered corruption when it does not involve money.

Corruption and Ideology

When facing the dilemma of choosing a candidate, voters are concerned about the policies that will be implemented, which involve trade-offs such as more or less government spending (Ansolabehere, 2006). Because each voter has spatial preferences over the issue, he or she chooses the candidate closest to an ideal policy, which means that voter follows a certain ideology.

The term ideology was originally coined by De Tracy (1817) to connote a science of ideas and it still can be understood as someone's value or belief system which is accepted as fact or truth (Singleton & Honeycutt, 2012). There are some systems which have been identified by the literature, such as liberal, conservative, socialist, feminist or fascist (Festenstein & Kenny, 2005).

People may identify themselves through one of these ideological traditions, which, in turn, will influence choice in an election. Literature suggests that ideological self-identification is one of the strongest and most consistent predictors of politicians' evaluation and choice in a number of countries, such as the United States (Mann, 1980, Conover & Feldman, 1981, Scotto, Stephenson, & Kornberg, 2004, Jost, 2006, Devine, 2012) and Brazil (Singer, 1998, Carreirão, 2002).

One common simplification of the concept of ideology is as a position on a liberal-conservative continuum (Erikson, Wright, & McIver 1993, Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & Russell, 1998), where voters position themselves according to their attitudes toward the size and role of government (Devine, 2012) or toward the willingness to change the status quo (Conover & Feldman, 1981). In two-candidate elections, they vote for the candidate whose ideology is closest to their own (Berry et al. 1998).

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Singer (1998) explains that even when people are not aware about the meaning of ideological positions (e.g. the differences between left and right orientation), an intuitive knowledge and feeling about the preferences of a candidate is sufficient for allowing them to vote coherently with their own ideas. Conover and Feldman (1981) explains that ideological identifications have largely symbolic meanings.

However, what would happen when the ideologically preferred candidate is corrupt? It is known that people generally prefer to vote for an honest candidate (Myerson, 1993, Person & Tabellini, 2004, Winters, & Shapiro, 2010, de Figueiredo, Hidalgo, & Kashara, 2011), thus, this situation creates a problem for the voter, who has to choose between honesty and ideology.

This situation happens in particular when there are only two options for the voter, what happens when there are only two established parties, what is the case of the North American electoral system (Myerson, 1993), or when there are only two competing candidates, which is the case of a second term presidential election in Brazil (Albuquerque, 1992).

To try to solve this puzzle, Myerson (1993) explained that voters may tolerate a dishonest candidate if he or she is ideologically preferred, because switching to an honest candidate risks giving the victory to a candidate of the opposite ideology. This idea is in accordance with Rundquist, Strom and Peters (1977), who discuss the possibilities that voters might support a corrupt politician if he more closely mirrors their ideological preferences.

However, this explanation seems not to be valid in all political contexts. For example, Borba (2005) explains that in Brazil, instead of relying mainly on ideology, voters are personalist-oriented. They decide their vote principally on the image of the individual attributes, personal characteristics, competence and honesty of the candidates (Silveira, 1998, Carreirão, 2000, Borba, 2005).

One point to be considered is the influence of ideology on corruption's appraisal. Literature suggests that people tend to reappraise dishonest information more often when the person who commits it is oneself instead of others (Chimonas, Brennan & Rothman, 2007). For instance, physicians reported that receiving gifts from the pharmaceutical industry is generally wrong, but when they faced this situation themselves, their evaluation changed, especially when they remembered how much sacrifice they made during medical training (Sah & Loewenstein, 2010).

Because ideology is part of one's identity (Iborra, 2005; Teles, 2008; Pimentel, 2008), it is possible that ideology may contribute to corruption's reappraisal. For instance, Van Kenhove, Vermeir and Verniers (2001), explains that an extreme-left view that considers that the riches are responsible for social inequality makes people reappraise theft in terms that it becomes not considered to be a crime if the theft is from the rich. Therefore, thinking about an electoral context, it is possible that voters reappraise more corruption information when the candidate shares their own ideological positions. Thus, we propose that:

H2: Ideology will interact with the relation between type of corruption and its perception in a way that:

H2a: when voters and the candidate share the same ideology, voters will consider that patronage is not corruption;

H2b: when voters and the candidate have different ideology, voters will perceive that patronage is corruption.

How to Measure Ideology

The measurement of ideology is a central problem in voting research (Jessee, 2010). A number of attempts have been made in order to measure ideology (e.g. Power & Zucco, 2009, Zucco, 2009, Jessee, 2010, Zucco & Lauderdale, 2011, Devine, 2012) and they have used very different approaches.

One reason for the differences among each measurement attempt is that ideology is a multi-dimensional construct that can be measured in terms of the three major policy dimensions: economic, foreign, and social policy (Devine, 2012), so that each attempt may have tried to measure only one of them. Even when two measurements use the same construct names, they may be measuring different concepts.

For example, one form of measuring ideology is as a position on a liberal-conservative continuum (Erikson *et al.,* 1993, Berry *et al.*, 1998). It can consider the distinction between liberalism and conservatism in terms of preference for a larger, more active government or for a smaller, less active government (Stimson, MacKuen, & Erikson, 1995, Devine, 2012) or in terms of attitudes toward change; liberals are viewed as accepting of change, and conservatives are viewed as resistant to change (Conover & Feldman, 1981).

In order to simplify ideology's assessment in this paper, it was measured only at its economic dimension. Its measurement is better explained at the method section. This assessment is consistent with a number of scholars, who explain that a position on a left-right continuum remains the most meaningful indicator of ideological positioning in contemporary democracies (Badescu & Sum 2005, Power & Zucco, 2009, Zucco, 2009, Zucco & Lauderdale, 2011).

In addition, it is important to consider the impact of political party on these relations. Literature suggests that political parties work as brands, signaling candidates' preferences to voters (Smith, 2001, Snyder & Ting, 2002). Consistent with this idea, political parties should strengthen the relations involving ideology. Thus, we propose that:

H3: The presence of a political party strengthens the interaction between ideology and type of corruption in a way that:

H3a: when voters and the candidate share the same ideology, the presence of a political party will increase voters' perception that patronage is not corruption;

H3b: when voters and the candidate have different ideology, the presence of a political party will increase voters' perception that patronage is corruption.

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Corruption's Reappraisal and Choice

Finally, it is important to consider the impact of corruption's appraisal on choice. In other words, the next step is, if the hypotheses above are true, to understand whether the perception of corruption influences choice. Mazar *et al.* (2008) explained that the fact that something is wrong seems to be sufficient to prevent one from doing so, because people wants to have an honest self-image.

Therefore, going back to an election context, if a person has to make a choice between a corrupt and an honest candidate, even if the corrupt candidate seems to be a better choice (e.g. more experienced), the fact that he is perceived as corrupt (e.g. what he or she did is perceived to be 'very wrong') should be sufficient to prevent this person from voting for this candidate.

This idea would rule out the hypothesis that the choice for a corrupt candidate is based on a cognitive cost-benefit analysis (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). In other words, the choice for a corrupt candidate would not depend on a perception that he or she is in fact corrupt but voting for him or her is worthwhile, but on a perception that what the candidate did is not 'wrong enough'.

This idea would also rule out the information hypothesis that voters' support to corrupt politicians happens when they lack information about candidates' involvement in corruption (Winters, & Shapiro, 2010). Instead of not having enough information, we propose that voters' support to corrupt politicians happens when the available information does not make the candidate seems to be 'corrupt enough'. Thus, we propose that:

H4: The way corruption is perceived (how wrong it is) affects choice.

Method

To test all hypotheses, we ran a web-based experiment using a 2 (mode of corruption: money vs. patronage) X 2 (ideology: liberal vs. interventionist) X 2 (political party: presence vs. absence) between subjects design. Brazilian subjects were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions. Our sample consists of 254 people who gave completed answers. The procedure was the following: when people agreed to participate, they received an instruction asking them to imagine a second term presidential election in which they would have to choose between two candidates to vote. They:

(1) read the profile of both candidates;
(2) made the decision in whom to vote for;
(3) answered a questionnaire measuring the type of processing (whether the corrupt candidate was seen as a cost-benefit choice – he steals, but he gets things done – or if he was seen as not corrupt);
(4) answered a questionnaire measuring ideology; and
(5) answered some socio-economic questions.

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The first candidate was João da Silva, a former state-governor who had 61% of citizen's approval and who had invested in important issues, such as education, health system and transportation. A qualitative pre-test showed that a candidate having these characteristics was considered competent.

However, João da Silva was accused of causing a BR$ 4 million loss in public accounts for giving money (vs. political positions) in exchange of political support. João da Silva was in favor of privatizations and less intervention on economy (vs. creation of state-owned companies and more intervention on economy). Half of participants saw that João da Silva was affiliated to a political party (PSDB for favoring less intervention on economy and PT for favoring more intervention on economy) while the other half did not.

The other candidate was Antonio de Oliveira, a less experienced honest candidate. A qualitative pre-test showed that he was less competent than João da Silva, but had the advantage of being honest. His characteristics didn't vary across conditions and no political party was mentioned.

The questionnaire measuring type of processing contained the indicators displayed on Figure 1. Because corruption can be chosen either due to a cognitive tradeoff (Figueiredo, 2004, Almeida, 2006, 2007) or to the perception that it was not 'wrong enough' (Mazar *et al.* 2008), this scale contains two dimensions, which was confirmed by a factor analysis. Subjects rated the statements using a Likert-rating, ranging from 1 ('I totally disagree') to 5 ('I totally agree').

Figure 1
Indicators of the Type of Processing Scale

Cost-Benefit 1	Even though he is corrupt, voting in João da Silva is worthwhile.
Cost-Benefit 2	The benefits for the population made João da Silva's wrong behavior worthwhile.
Cost-Benefit 3	I am conscious that João da Silva is corrupt. But at least, he gets things done.
Cronbach's Alpha = .7	
Reappraisal 1	João da Silva was not corrupt. He only used the needed political mechanisms to get things done.
Reappraisal 2	There was no dishonest behavior from João da Silva. He did what everybody does.
Reappraisal 3	Considering the political context and the national reality, João da Silva's behavior is appropriate.
Cronbach's Alpha = .8	

The questionnaire measuring type of ideology contained the indicators displayed on Figure 2. As said before, it used the economic dimension of ideology, measured in terms of the role of the government in the economy.

Factorial analysis resulted in two dimensions, suggesting that identification with interventionism ideas is not completely opposed to identification with economic liberal ideas. Subjects rated the statements using a Likert-rating, ranging from 1 ('I totally disagree') to 5 ('I totally agree').

Figure 2
Indicators of the Ideology Scale

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Interventionism 1	I favor a higher State intervention on the economy.
Interventionism 2	Social programs that transferred income to the poorest were important to change Brazil's reality.
Interventionism 3	Capitalism harms the poorest.
Cronbach's Alpha = .6	
Liberalism 1	Privatizations were positive for Brazilian economy.
Liberalism 2	The capitalist competition is healthy when based on meritocracy (more benefits for whom is more competent).
Cronbach's Alpha = .6	

Thus, this scale resulted in two scores for each subject, which was used to interact with candidate's ideology. No main effect of candidate's ideology on type of processing or choice is expected. However, we expect that voters' behavior will differ when their ideology matches with João da Silva's from when it mismatches.

Results

The characteristics of the sample are summarized in Table 1. Subjects are not supposed to represent the Brazilian population. All demographic characteristics are used as controls for our results.

Table 1
Sample Summary Statistics

Condition	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Political Party	No				PT		PSDB	
Ideology	Interventionist		Liberal		Interventionist		Liberal	
Type of Misconduct	Patronage	Money	Patronage	Money	Patronage	Money	Patronage	Money
n	35	38	36	29	33	32	27	24
Demographics	Percentage							
Gender: Male	65,7%	63,2%	44,4%	62,1%	48,5%	34,4%	44,4%	58,3%
Age: 18 to 24	14,3%	21,1%	16,7%	27,6%	9,1%	6,2%	14,8%	12,5%
25 to 29	8,6%	18,4%	19,4%	20,7%	21,2%	6,2%	33,3%	20,8%
30 to 39	40,0%	28,9%	27,8%	31,0%	39,4%	50,0%	37,0%	29,2%
40 to 49	14,3%	10,5%	8,3%	6,9%	12,1%	21,9%	7,4%	8,3%
50 to 59	11,4%	13,2%	11,1%	6,9%	9,1%	6,2%	3,7%	16,7%
60+	11,4%	7,9%	16,7%	6,9%	9,1%	9,4%	3,7%	12,5%
Marital Status:								
Married	40,0%	39,5%	22,2%	20,7%	33,3%	46,9%	33,3%	29,2%
Divorced	8,6%	0,0%	11,1%	0,0%	3,0%	6,2%	3,7%	25,0%
Cohabiting	11,4%	10,5%	13,9%	6,9%	18,2%	9,4%	11,1%	0,0%
Single	37,1%	50,0%	50,0%	72,4%	45,5%	34,4%	51,9%	45,8%
Widow	2,9%	0,0%	2,8%	0,0%	0,0%	3,1%	0,0%	0,0%
City of residence:								
São Paulo	40,0%	63,2%	55,6%	58,6%	60,6%	62,5%	40,7%	62,5%
Rio de Janeiro	20,0%	5,3%	16,7%	6,9%	9,1%	12,5%	18,5%	8,3%
Schooling: High School	5,7%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Complete								

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bachelor degree	31,4%	34,2%	33,3%	44,8%	27,3%	15,6%	22,2%	25,0%
Incomplete bachelor degree	2,9%	15,8%	5,6%	17,2%	6,1%	6,2%	14,8%	12,5%
Graduate degree	60,0%	50,0%	61,1%	37,9%	66,7%	78,1%	63,0%	62,5%
Monthly family income (in R$): Up to R$678,00	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	3,1%	0,0%	0,0%
R$678,01 to R$1.356,00	2,9%	2,6%	2,8%	0,0%	3,0%	3,1%	11,1%	0,0%
R$1.356,01 to R$3.390,00	17,1%	10,5%	2,8%	6,9%	6,1%	12,5%	14,8%	12,5%
R$3.390,01 to R$6.780,00	0,0%	21,1%	16,7%	24,1%	12,1%	15,6%	25,9%	8,3%
R$6.780,01 to R$10.170,00	20,0%	10,5%	13,9%	24,1%	30,3%	6,2%	11,1%	16,7%
iR$10.170,00 to R$13.560,00	17,1%	5,3%	27,8%	3,4%	9,1%	6,2%	14,8%	25,0%
R$13.560,01+	42,9%	50,0%	36,1%	41,4%	39,4%	53,1%	22,2%	37,5%

We ran a set of regressions, where mode of corruption (money vs. patronage), João da Silva's ideology (interventionist vs. liberal), subjects' level of favoring interventionism and liberalism were the independent variables and type of processing (Reappraisal and Cost-Benefit) served as the dependent variables. We measured the independent variables' main effects and also the interaction effects among them. Because some subjects saw João da Silva as belonging to a political party and others did not, we ran additional separate regressions for them. Results are summarized in Tables 2, 3 and 4.

Table 2
Regressions' Results – Absence of Political Party

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	Absence of Political Party					
	Reappraisal (DV)			Cost-Benefit Evaluation (DV)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Main Effects						
Type of Corruption	-.347**	-.304	-.296	-.068	.016	-.037
Candidate's Ideology	.204	.189	1.604	.118	.192	2.219*
Intervencionism	-.021	-.073	.191	.001	-.063	.188
Liberalism	.232***	.167	.044	.256***	.266**	.332*
Interactions						
_Candidates Ideology*Intervencionism			-.673***			-.493**
_Candidates Ideology*Liberalism			.200			-.132
_Candidates Ideology*Intervencionism*Type of Corruption			.297			.019
_Candidates Ideology*Liberalism*Type of Corruption			-.286*			-.020
Controls						
Gender	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Age	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Income	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Schooling	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Marital Status	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
City	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
F-value	3.565***	1.112	1.504**	2.665**	1.435	1.475*
R^2	.097	.322	.424	.074	.380	.419
Adjusted R^2	.070	.032	.142	.046	.115	.135

Notes:

1. DV: Dependent Variable

2. *$p < 0.10$.

3. **$p < 0.05$

4. ***$p < 0.01$

Table 3
Regressions' Results – Presence of Political Party

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	Presence of Political Party					
	Reappraisal (DV)			Cost-Benefit Evaluation (DV)		
	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Main Effects						
Type of Corruption	-.496**	-.697***	-.634**	-.356**	-.323	-.303
Candidate's Ideology	-.008	-.200	.489	-.132	-.386*	1.547
Intervencionism	.107	.121	.218	-.027	.014	.184
Liberalism	-.083	-.142	-.151	.004	.008	.080
Interactions						
_Candidates Ideology*Intervencionism			-.429*			-.739***
_Candidates Ideology*Liberalism			.170			.076
_Candidates Ideology*Intervencionism*Type of Corruption			.208			.443*
_Candidates Ideology*Liberalism*Type of Corruption			-.179			-.336*
Controls						
Gender	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Age	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Income	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Schooling	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Marital Status	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
City	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
F-value	3.350**	1.066	1045	1.574	.793	.988
R^2	.108	.380	.411	.054	.020	.397
Adjusted R^2	.076	.024	.018	.020	-.082	-.005

Notes:

1. DV: Dependent Variable

2. *$p < 0.10$.

3. **$p < 0.05$

4. ***$p < 0.01$

Table 4
Regressions' Results – Total Sample

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	Total Sample					
	Reappraisal (DV)			Cost-Benefit Evaluation (DV)		
	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
Main Effects						
Type of Corruption	-.384***	-.362***	-.393**	-.181	-.128	-.165
Candidate's Ideology	.042	.022	.868	-.036	-.074	1.026
Intervencionism	.049	.064	.253***	-.001	.019	.175*
Liberalism	.101*	.082	-.004	.152**	.186**	.189*
Interactions						
_Candidates Ideology*Intervencionism			-.547***			-.399**
_Candidates Ideology*Liberalism			.232			.039
_Candidates Ideology*Intervencionism*Type of Corruption			.283**			.160
_Candidates Ideology*Liberalism*Type of Corruption			-.231**			-.126
Controls						
Gender	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Age	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Income	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Schooling	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Marital Status	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
City	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
F-value	3.337**	.903	1.279	2.225*	1.121	1.210
R^2	.051	.193	.271	.035	.229	.260
Adjusted R^2	.036	-.021	.059	.019	.025	.045

Notes:

1. DV: Dependent Variable

2. *$p < 0.10$.

3. **$p < 0.05$

4. ***$p < 0.01$

Table 4 reports the main effect of type of corruption on reappraisal (model 15). Corruption involving patronage significantly decreases the perception that the candidate is 'not that wrong' (β = -.393; SE = .184, p < .05), supporting hypothesis 1. Interestingly, if we compare Model 3 (Table 2) and Model 9 (Table 3), we can see that the effect of corruption on reappraisal only happens in the presence of a political party. However, there was no significant effect of type of corruption on cost-benefit tradeoff (β = -.165; SE = .188, p: ns).

Surprisingly, we found that in this context, the level of interventionism was also a significant predictor of a higher level of reappraisal. However, this effect disappeared when we split the file into absence and presence of a political party.

We also found an effect of ideology on reappraisal for people who favor interventionism, which indicates that when the voter and the candidate share the interventionist ideology, the

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voter perceives the candidate as being 'less wrong' than when they have different ideologies (β = -.547; SE = .145, p < .01). Comparing Model 3 (Table 2) and Model 9 (Table 3), it is visible that this effect is stronger when there is no political party. However, we found the same effect for the cost-benefit trade off (β = -.399; SE = .147, p < .05), which suggests that people who favors interventionism saw João da Silva as corrupt, but worthwhile.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that ideology would interact with the relation between type of corruption and its perception in a way that when voters and the candidate shared the same ideology, voters would consider that patronage was not corruption and when voters and the candidate had different ideology, voters would perceive that patronage was corruption. Even though, we found a significant interaction for people who favor interventionism (β = .283; SE = .136, p < .05), when we split the file into absence and presence of political party, this result loses its significance (β = .297; SE = .181, p: ns and β = .208, SE = .249, p: ns; respectively).

Nevertheless, we found the predicted interaction for people who favors economic liberalism, such that when the candidate had a liberal view, voters were less prone to consider that patronage was corruption (β = -.231; SE = .112, p < .05). In addition, we could not find the same effect for the cost-benefit tradeoff, for both interventionists and liberals (β = .160; SE = .139, p: ns and β = -.126, SE = .114, p: ns; respectively).

Comparing Model 3 (Table 2) and Model 9 (Table 3), we can see that the interaction of candidate's ideology, voter's liberalism and mode of corruption has only approached significance in the absence of a political party ($\beta_{absence}$ = -.286; SE = .152, p = .063 and $\beta_{presence}$ = -.179, SE = .189, p: ns). Thus, even though we found an interaction, as proposed by hypothesis 3, it is on the contrary direction, suggesting that the chosen political parties weakens the interaction between ideology and type of corruption instead of strengthening it.

After evaluating the impact of mode of corruption and ideology on type of processing, the next step is to investigate if they impact choice. Choice is evaluated by testing hypothesis 4.

To do so, we ran a logistic regression where the choice of the corrupt candidate was the dependent variable and mode of corruption (money vs. patronage), João da Silva's ideology (interventionist vs. liberal), subjects' level of favoring interventionism and liberalism were the independent variables. Such as what we did before, we looked for main effects and for the interaction among these variables.

Table 5
Logistic Regressions' Results – Choice

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	Choice (DV)								
	Absence of Political Party			Presence of Political Party			Full Sample		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Main Effects									
Type of Corruption	-.108	.061	-.108	-.338	-.410	-1.273	-.126	-.031	-.296
Candidate's Ideology	.347	.451	2.466	.335	.159	19.774***	.178	.258	5.378**
Intervencionism	-.199	-.329	.495	.201	.505	3.322***	-.019	.053	.972***
Liberalism	.689***	.454	.036	-.152	-.245	.728	.298*	.164	.020
Interactions									
_Candidates Ideology*Intervencionism			-50.915			-4.773***			-2.882***
_Candidates Ideology*Liberalism			37.851			-.1.128			.887*
_Candidates Ideology*Intervencionism*Type of Corruption			50.127			.241			1.331**
_Candidates Ideology*Liberalism*Type of Corruption			-37.733			-.078			-.887**
Controls									
Gender	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Age	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Income	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Schooling	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Marital Status	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
City	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Notes:

1. DV: Dependent Variable

2. *$p < 0.10$.

3. **$p < 0.05$

4. ***$p < 0.01$

We found two main effects: of candidate's ideology (β = 5.378; SE = 2.547, p < .05) and of interventionism (β = .972; SE = .306, p < .01), both driven by the presence of political party. More interestingly, we found positive interactions between ideology and type of corruption on the prediction of choice, as displayed on Model 9 (Table 5). This pattern appeared only for the full sample.

This finding is consistent with literature, providing additional evidence for the robustness of the main effect of ideology on a candidate's choice (Singer, 1998, Carreirão, 2002, Scotto, Stephenson, & Kornberg, 2004, Jost, 2006, Devine, 2012). It also shows that type of corruption is an additional factor that voters take into account when they have to choose for a candidate.

Finally, we regressed the modes of processing (reappraisal and cost-benefit tradeoff) on choice. Both reappraisal and cost-benefit tradeoff were significant predictors of choice (β = 1.334, SE = .251, p < .001; β = .977, SE = .219, p < .001, respectively). We found support for hypothesis 4, as the candidate was more likely to be voted when the voter saw him as less corrupt. However, we found the same effect for the cost-benefit tradeoff, which means that when the candidate's behavior is seen as wrong, but worthwhile, people are more likely to vote for him as well.

Discussion

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The aim of this paper was: (1) to investigate which mechanisms are behind voters' perception of corruption; and (2) to investigate in which conditions the perception of corruption influences choice.

This study's results showed that different kinds of corruption can affect the way people process this information. More specifically, it indicated that when corruption did not involve money, people reappraised more. This finding is consistent with Mazar *et al.* (2008)'s study that found people to cheat more when the reward for cheating was tokens instead of coins.

It also showed that ideology is more important than mode of corruption in affecting choice. However, it showed that under different modes of misconduct, ideology has a different effect. An important contribution of this paper is that it empirically found what was suggested by Myerson (1993), that voters may tolerate a dishonest candidate if he or she is ideologically preferred. It went further, suggesting that ideology can facilitate the perception that a milder form of corruption should not be considered to be corruption.

Finally, this study expanded current knowledge about corruption reappraisal showing that it not only happens for people's own dishonest acts, but also for dishonest acts from other people, as long as they share the same ideology. By showing this, we suggest that dishonest from another person may hurt people's own self-concept, as long as they identify themselves with this other person.

This paper contributed to our understanding of some mechanisms underlying the choice of a candidate, nevertheless, it meets some limitations. For instance, in the experimental procedure, people first had to choose one candidate and, afterwards, fill in the type of processing form. This may have made respondents rationalize their choice, what may have affected their answers. Other experimental designs can replicate this study using a different order.

Another limitation is that the manipulation said that the candidate was suspected from being corrupt, but there was no evidence to prove it. If he or she was already condemned, the answers' pattern may have been different. This modification in the experimental design can also be tried in future research.

Moreover, future research can investigate whether other modes of corruption which does not directly involve money can also be reappraised by voters. For example, if instead of patronage, the non-monetary type of corruption was public contracts, would the reappraisal process be different? This kind of investigation could shed light on what kinds of behaviors are considered to be corruption by the Brazilian (or other nationalities) voters.

Finally, differences across cultures would also be welcome. This paper found that under certain conditions (when the candidate shares voters' ideology), Brazilian voters did not perceive patronage to be corruption, but as an acceptable behavior. It may happen because it may be seen as part of the coalition game, provided that Brazil has a plurality system (Zucco, 2010). However, in a country with the winner-takes-all system, where the president does not need to make coalitions do govern, would patronage be viewed as acceptable under any circumstance? This question is also an interesting matter of further investigation.

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